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Abstract
Do radical right fringe parties affect main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? Using data from the Manifesto
Project, we analyze the relationship between radical right fringe parties’ and main parties’ policy programs regarding
sociocultural issues in six post-communist countries of CEE. Even though radical right fringe parties have participated
in government in several of these countries, and in Hungary a fringe party has become the country’s second largest party,
our analysis shows that the sociocultural issues in radical right fringe party manifestos do not systematically relate to the
changes in main party manifestos regarding those issues. Even if some of the main parties in our study might often agree
with the radical right fringe parties, our analysis shows that the latter do not directly influence the policy priorities of the
main parties.
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Introduction
What is the effect of fringe parties on main parties in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE)? The role of, especially,
radical right fringe parties has been a source of contention
among scholars. Some scholars have found that these par-
ties, which compete along a narrow set of sociocultural
issues, exert influence on main parties, particularly but not
only on the right. This effect sees the latter moving further
and further toward extreme nativist, authoritarian, and
xenophobe positions both in Western Europe (WE) (e.g.
Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Han, 2015; Schumacher
and van Kersbergen, 2016) and in some CEE countries
(Minkenberg, 2017; Pytlas, 2015; Pytlas and Kossack,
2015). Radical right fringe parties are said to play the role
of agenda setters to which main parties respond often by
accommodating and adopting the most salient issues. This
role attributed to the radical right fringe is said to be even
stronger in CEE compared to WE because of the compara-
tively greater salience of sociocultural issues in post-
communist societies. Case study analyses have supported
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this pattern between main and fringe parties, especially for
the Hungarian parties Fidesz and radical right Jobbik
(Kreko´ and Mayer, 2015; Pirro, 2015a, 2015b). In strong
contrast to these claims, other scholars find that the influ-
ence of fringe parties in CEE is overstated and there is little
evidence that they affect changes in main party positions
(Akkerman, 2015; Meyer and Rosenberger, 2015; Mudde,
2013). Thus, currently we have conflicting arguments and
findings about the effect of radical right fringe parties on
the main parties in CEE. So far, these findings have been
based mainly on demand side, media, and qualitative anal-
yses in single countries or limited country comparisons.
This article extends the investigation to an analysis of
the relationship between radical right fringe parties’ and
main parties’ policy programs in six CEE countries over
27 years. We consider radical right fringe parties to be
small relative to their party system. They compete on a
limited number of noneconomic issues and their radical
right profile is created by their nativist and authoritarian
policy positions. The cases selected for analysis are
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania
and Slovakia. Our research question therefore is: Do radi-
cal right fringe parties in CEE exert a measurable effect on
main parties’ political agenda? We argue that such an
effect is in evidence if two conditions are met: (1) there
is a significant positive relationship between the salience of
an issue in the radical right fringe party manifesto and the
main party manifesto. (2) This positive relationship differs
markedly from the average change in salience on that issue
for all parties in the system. The latter thus serves as a
benchmark to filter out trends affecting the entire party
system. In our analysis, we draw on sociocultural issues
in the Manifesto data (Volkens et al., 2018) and examine
all available parties in CEE which fit the definitions out-
lined below. We also test for differences between countries
and issue categories.
Our article proceeds as follows: In the next segment,
we address the thorny issue of conceptualizing “radical
right fringe” and “main party” in the context of the
highly volatile and fragmented polities of CEE. In dis-
cussing the literature, we lay out the arguments and then
present in detail our methodology. In the subsequent
section, we provide an overview of radical right fringe
parties in the regions and present their profiles along
with classifications of whether they are radical right.
Then, the article proceeds to the main analysis and dis-
cusses our findings. Our analysis shows that radical right
fringe parties actually have little or no influence on
issue salience among the main political parties as we
do not find a relationship between their policy programs.
We, thus, confirm those previous studies arguing that
fringe parties do not independently affect the behavior
of main parties. Finally, we conclude by discussing the
theoretical implications of our results.
Conceptualizing radical right fringe parties
and party competition in CEE
In this segment, we will first introduce our key concept of
“fringe” as well as the subset of radical right fringe party
and discuss the context of party competition in CEE. Sub-
sequently, we present the arguments for why we would
expect radical right fringe parties to exert influence on
main parties.
Fringe parties in the context of volatile
and fragmented party systems
Scholars have defined “fringe party” in a number of ways
and often use it in a pejorative sense to differentiate
between “reasonable” mainstream politics and the
“extreme.” “Fringe” is often thought of in terms of low
voter support, tiny party membership, and niche represen-
tation and thus normally not electorally relevant (Arzhei-
mer, 2011: 638–639). They are contrasted in particular to
“main parties,” meaning those that dominate the party com-
petition because of their size and roles in the political sys-
tem, especially being at the core of government formation.
The relationship between these two broad party types is at
the heart of this investigation (see especially Gherghina and
Fagan, 2019).
However, the term “fringe” party needs further elabora-
tion as “some parties remain isolated and outside the polit-
ical mainstream although they attract large segments of the
electorate” (Gherghina and Fagan, 2019) and thus vote-
share and electoral success are not necessarily a knockout
criterion for the categorization. Fringe can be considered
marginal or extreme only in relation to other parties (Arz-
heimer, 2011: 639). In a liberal democratic regime, extreme
positions on both sides of the political spectrum that pro-
mote a radical transformation of the political systems are
clearly considered “fringe” (Adams et al., 2006: 513).
These parties combine “ideological radicalism with a tri-
bune discourse pitting certain sections of society—per-
ceived to have been ignored by the mainstream parties—
versus a large range of patricians of which political elites
are the primary but not sole members” (Nedelcu, 2012: 8).
The definition also depends on time: ideological views that
were once considered fringe or extreme are becoming
increasingly prevalent as former fringe parties are entering
mainstream politics (Polyakova and Shekhovtsov, 2016).
The turmoil in CEE party systems makes it challenging to
define “fringe” in relation to ideological extremism or
diminutive political influence.
In our work, we accept the main argument of the fringe
party literature discussed above that these parties are small
relative to their respective party system (Gherghina and
Fagan, 2019). However, as a study of how extra-
parliamentary parties affect main parties would be theore-
tically and empirically outside of the scope of this article,
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we restrict ourselves to the study of small parties with
parliamentary representation. Furthermore, we follow
Meguid (2005: 347–348) and Wagner (2011: 847) whose
work on niche party challengers and main party response
has been instrumental for conceptualizing this relationship.
The main characteristics of such parties are that they reject
the traditional class-based orientation of politics and that
their issues often do not coincide with the existing left–
right lines of political division (Meguid, 2005). Further-
more, they are perceived either as single-issue parties
(Meguid, 2005) or as competing “primarily on a small
number of non-economic issues” (Wagner, 2011: 847).
While this definition encompasses parties of every possible
ideological persuasion, we will see in the next section that
the radical right—for which the primary issues are nativism
and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007)—plays a deep-seated
cultural and political role in CEE. Thus, given the surge of
nationalist identity politics and the political strength of both
the radical and mainstream right in CEE, this analysis will
focus primarily on the relationship between (a) radical right
fringe parties, meaning small parties competing on a lim-
ited number of issues around nativist and authoritarian val-
ues, and (b) main parties, meaning large parties that are the
radical right parties’ primary contender in the party system.
Radical right issues in CEE transition societies
There is an extensive literature suggesting that the wide-
spread appeal of nationalism and nativism, two key com-
ponents of radical right-wing populism (Mudde, 2007), is
strongly connected to CEE’s long history of outside dom-
ination and restricted national sovereignty. This caused
competing historical narratives, unfulfilled national aspira-
tions while increasing the salience of ethnic or religious
cleavages within these societies (Henderson, 2008; Hlou-
sˇek and Kopecˇek, 2008; Minkenberg, 2010, 2015). In fact,
as Minkenberg (2015: 41) argues, “[traditional and] new
cleavages do not structure party competition in a stable
fashion, except for the ethnic cleavage [ . . . ].” The role
of collective identities, especially ethnic ones, has been
central to understanding party competition in CEE and “the
subject of dozens of studies analysing transitional develop-
ments in post-communist countries” (Gya´rfa´sˇova´ and
Mesezˇnikov, 2015: 224). Thus, historical grievances and
imagined or genuine national traumas continue to serve
as sociocultural sources of political contestation (Minken-
berg, 2015: 27–42). This historical legacy has also led to
the phenomenon that such nationalist and nativist positions
can not only be found in the policy profiles of right-wing
but also in left-wing parties (Marks et al., 2006: 159).
Furthermore, delayed European integration also affected
the advent of radical right parties in that the harsh condi-
tions of membership imposed on the accession countries
needed to be defended by the political mainstream, espe-
cially the government parties (Harmsen, 2010; Harmsen
and Spiering, 2004: 228; Riishøj, 2004: 7). Whereas ini-
tially, European Union (EU) accession had been a valence
issue in all pre-accession countries, joining the EU “late”
meant that membership was now viewed unfavorably by
significant segments of the voting publics. Thus, the greater
the cost and the higher the imposed conditionality, the
greater was the potential for the political opposition to
exploit the accession process for political gain. When dis-
illusionment with the accession process set in, mainstream
parties on the right were arguably better positioned to
champion nationalist causes and adopt more Eurosceptical
positions. This is because the main competition had ini-
tially been between the reformist center–right and the less
reform-willing left. By the mid-1990s, this changed as left-
leaning parties – except for the rather marginalized
communist parties – were no longer potential obstacles to
pro-Western reforms but became in part rather market-
liberal or turned to ethno-cultural issues for mobilization
(Ishiyama and Bozo´ki, 2002). Newly established, mainly
radical right parties rushed in to fill the Eurosceptical, anti-
reformist gap. The main right-wing parties had to respond
to this development to remain competitive (Henderson,
2008: 121–22; Neumayer, 2008: 136).
An important distinctive feature of CEE party systems is
their “under-institutionalization” (Minkenberg, 2015: 34),
making the parties “disconcertingly fluid” and contributing
to “permeable borders between the radical right and the
mainstream right” (Minkenberg, 2015: 34). Rovny (2014:
675) comments that although “party organizations in East-
ern Europe remain weak and fluid, the ideological frames
of party competition are surprisingly structured.” Espe-
cially, new protest parties want to draw a contrast to the
post-transition mainstream by attacking the latter for polit-
ical corruption and “selling out” the national interest to
international political forces (Zapryanova, 2010). This, in
turn, reenforces the centrality of the sociocultural issue
dimension in CEE party competition.
Explaining the effect of radical right fringe
parties on main parties
Turning to our research question and main arguments, we
need to appraise briefly the aforementioned political con-
ditions to understand why we would expect the effect of
radical right fringe parties on main parties to be particularly
pronounced in CEE. The process of regime transition and
modernization in CEE resulted in an increase in anti-liberal
and Eurosceptical positions. The permeability of the parties
themselves and the volatility of the party system imply that
main parties, especially but not exclusively on the right,
needed to respond effectively to such challenges lest they
risked a party split or would have to contend with fringe
party rivals that continue to morph and present new chal-
lenges. Thus far, studies on party behavior both in WE and
CEE have identified three distinct reactions by main parties
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to their radical right fringe challenger: adaption, partial co-
option with isolation, and no discernible reaction. For WE
party systems, studies have focused either primarily on
mainstream (i.e. moderate or centrist) parties instead of
main parties or on niche instead of radical right fringe
parties. As there is a wide overlap between these sets of
parties, both of these discussions are relevant here.
The most commonly analyzed pattern of main (or main-
stream) parties reacting to the radical right is the adaption
of the former to the latter, producing consequences for the
electoral fortunes of both sets of parties. With radical right
fringe parties emphasizing issues such as immigration and
nationalism related to the cultural value dimension, they
present a substantial and lasting challenge to their main
party competitors, which are still largely focused on socio-
economic contestation. Several studies of WE party sys-
tems conclude that radical right parties have succeeded in
“dragging” the mainstream toward themselves (Abou-
Chadi, 2016; Han, 2015; Schumacher and van Kersbergen,
2016), because they compete on the sociocultural dimen-
sion, while main parties still largely focus on the socio-
economic contestation (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018).
This “dragging” can manifest itself by affecting main-
stream parties’ programs, government policies, and/or pub-
lic discourse. Similarly, studies focusing on the electoral
threat of the radical right to mainstream parties suggest that
mainstream parties move their position in the hope of
“stealing” both ownership of issues and voters (back) from
their radical right challengers (Meguid, 2005; Otjes, 2011).
Several cross-country studies found that both mainstream
right and mainstream left parties adjusted their positions
with regard to immigration, integration, or multiculturalism
(Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Han,
2015; van Spanje, 2010) or more broadly on the cultural
dimension (Minkenberg, 2001; Wagner and Meyer, 2017).
The external conditions in CEE countries are different to
WE because party competition is dominated by sociocul-
tural issues. Until the recent refugee crisis, the issue of
immigration was not politicized, while national minorities
played a central role in radical right parties’ mobilization
(Busˇtı´kova´, 2017). Despite these contextual differences,
Minkenberg (2017) argues that the mechanisms underlying
the contagious impact of radical right parties are the same
in CEE and that the “radical right’s effect occurred primar-
ily by shifting the overall political agenda to the right in the
dimension of identity politics” (2017: 134). Using expert
survey data to measure shifts in party positions in five CEE
countries and interpreting the underlying mechanisms in
qualitative explorations, Pytlas and Kossack (2015) show
that mainstream parties on the right not only accommodate
identity-related issues but also co-opt the frames from rad-
ical right parties’ narratives. Studies focusing on the con-
sequences of such behavior have shown that they are
sometimes successful, for instance when the Hungarian
Fidesz successfully crowded out the radical right MIE´P
(Pytlas, 2018a: 193).
Two alternative schools of thought challenge the claim
that radical right fringe parties affect mainstream parties
directly. The first argues that conservative and center–right
parties do not really adopt the radical right positions but
rather merely imitate the rhetoric of the latter—or co-opt
some of these positions while still isolating the “pariah”
politically (van Spanje and de Graaf, 2018; see also: Spies
and Franzmann, 2011; van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007).
Studies in CEE have found similar patterns in individual
countries, suggesting that main parties engage in adversar-
ial strategies and attempt to isolate their challengers polit-
ically when faced with radical parties (e.g. Pirro, 2015b;
Pytlas, 2015). Because of the general acceptability and
legitimacy of radical right frames and narratives, the adop-
tion of some radical right rhetoric or positions might then
result in a radicalization of the mainstream. Moreover, if
the radical right is capable of maintaining ownership of
their frames (in this case, nativist and nationalist or ethno-
centric claims), it results in what Pytlas calls the “contest
over meaning” (2015: 48). However, whether fringe parties
maintain their frame ownership or main parties success-
fully co-opt these policies (potentially resulting in the
demise of such fringe parties), the programmatic effect
on main parties remains the same.
The second alternative school of thought calls into ques-
tion whether there is any impact of radical right parties on
the behavior of their competitors at all (e.g. Akkerman,
2015; Meyer and Rosenberger, 2015; Mudde, 2013).
Mudde (2013: 8–9) argues that parties respond to voter
demands (or their perception of voter demands) in the over-
all party-political context but do not make significant
adjustments based on the issue salience of competing par-
ties. The radical right is thus “not the main factor behind the
‘anti-immigrant turn’ of mainstream parties” (Alonso and
Fonseca, 2012: 869) but rather a symptom of a discourse
generally shifting to the right. Similarly, comparative stud-
ies focusing on CEE party systems regularly accentuate
that traditionalist, nationalist, and even racist positions are
equally found among established parties, Poland and
Romania being cited often in this context (e.g. Busˇtı´kova´,
2017). Busˇtı´kova´ (2017) even speaks of “radical main-
stream parties” blurring the boundaries between the main-
stream and the fringes. A general discursive openness
toward radical right positions provides a permissive envi-
ronment for mainstream parties on the right. Squeezed out
by mainstream politics, however, radical right challenger
parties have therefore been found to be only “moderately
successful” (Pirro, 2015a: 80; Pytlas, 2018b).1
Many of the studies focusing on radical right fringe and
main parties in CEE acknowledge the importance of main
party reactions to their radical right challenger but ulti-
mately focus on the electoral fortunes of the latter and the
role of the demand side in its explanation (Busˇtı´kova´, 2014;
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Busˇtı´kova´ and Kitschelt, 2009; Kluknavska´ and Smolı´k,
2016; Pytlas, 2015). Similarly, genuinely party-centered
studies investigating the role of party organizations, propa-
ganda, and leadership concentrate on explaining the elec-
toral success of these parties (Werkmann and Gherghina,
2018) or their internal configurations (Gherghina, 2014).
Those studies that have focused on whether and how main
parties react to radical right fringe parties have done so in
one to three countries and base their analysis on public
opinion or media data as well as qualitative interpretations
of issues frames (Minkenberg, 2017; Pytlas, 2018a; Pytlas
and Kossck, 2015). Thus, while this article is not the first to
investigate the question of whether main parties in CEE are
affected by radical right fringe parties, its most important
contribution lies in investigating this effect on the policy
program of main parties. Thus, we shift the focus from the
“contest over meaning” and ownership of particular frames
to the parties’ policies and positions. How and to what
extent have (radical right) fringe parties exerted program-
matic influence on their “nearby main competitors” on the
sociocultural dimension? To trace these programmatic
effects, and in an attempt to overcome the limited focus
of either single-country studies or studies concentrating on
narrow time frames, we include radical right fringe parties
from six countries in CEE (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) from 1990 to 2017.
We focus on radical right parties as the most common
fringe parties and on the main parties that are their main
competitors, as they are the most likely to be affected by the
radical right parties. If radical right fringe parties do not
affect those main parties’ policies, they are unlikely to
affect any other parties’ profiles. These main parties are
mostly center–right parties but, given the complexity of the
CEE party systems, they might also be radical right or
mainstream left parties. Given the centrality of the socio-
cultural dimension to both the general political competition
in CEE and to radical right fringe parties in particular
(Pytlas, 2018a: 196–97; see also Kluknavska´ and Smolı´k,
2016), we draw on parties’ position regarding sociocultural
issues. Following the most recent and dominant literature
from WE and some findings from previous CEE studies, as
discussed above, we expect that main parties are likely to
adjust their programs to the radical right parties’ programs
on a range of salient sociocultural issue. Thus, we formu-
late the following hypothesis: When competing with a rad-
ical right fringe party, the main party significantly changes
its position in the direction of the most salient issue posi-
tions of radical right fringe party. To support this hypoth-
esis, two types of evidence are needed: First, there has to be
a significant increase in the salience a main right party
attributes to an issue that is highly salient for the competing
fringe party. Second, the increase in main party issue sal-
ience has to differ significantly from the average change in
salience on that issue for all parties in the system.
To test this hypothesis, we utilize Manifesto data pro-
vided by the 2018a MARPOR update (Volkens et al.,
2018). These data consist of the relative shares of quasisen-
tences in parties’ electoral programs that were attributed to
56 main policy categories by specially trained expert coders.
Consistent with the argument above regarding the centrality
of the sociocultural dimension in CEE party competition, we
focus our analysis on 11 sociocultural Manifesto categories:
culture, nationalism positive and negative, traditional mor-
ality positive and negative, law and order, civic mindedness,
multiculturalism positive and negative, as well as positive
mentions of minority and noneconomic demographic
groups. While there have been debates around the reliability
of some aspects of the Manifesto data (e.g. Gemenis, 2013;
Volkens et al., 2013), employing these data has the advan-
tages that its standardized numerical scores allow for cross-
country and cross-time comparison, that it covers all CEE
countries since 1990 and that includes almost all parties
relevant to our research question. Furthermore, our focus
on the sociocultural issue categories avoids the known prob-
lems around category aggregation and index building.
Empirical analysis
We examine the party system of the six largest CEE member
states of the EU, which are comparable with each other due
to their general historical and geographic communalities. By
comparison, the Baltic States and the Western Balkans have
been shaped by profoundly different sociocultural and geo-
political developments, resulting in unique issue environ-
ments affecting national party politics to such an extent
that the inclusion of these cases in this framework would
present genuine problems of comparability. In the Baltic
countries, the overriding and singular issue of the relation-
ship with ethnic Russians and Russia is not just sociocultural
but rather one that is geopolitical, raising questions of
national security and external alliances. Similarly, the West-
ern Balkan presents an issue environment shaped by the
violent breakup of former Yugoslavia and the conditions
of recent state formation. This includes territorial disputes
(Croatia and Slovenia), clashes over the nature of the state
(Bosnia, Macedonia) or even the very acceptance of state-
hood (Kosovo), as well as overriding concerns about pro-
tecting national institutions and language after just gaining
sovereignty for the first time (Slovenia). While sociocultural
issues are bound up with these questions, their implications
are much wider and not just limited to a dyadic contestation
between main parties and the fringe where the latter may be
assumed to serve as agenda setter. In cases such as Croatia
and Serbia, it is the main parties and not necessarily the
fringe that emerged from the nationalist formations most
engaged in the conflict. Other countries in the area that are
not included in our analysis, such as the Ukraine, are not
members of the EU and even more difficult to compare
meaningfully. They had emerged from the breakup of
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the former Soviet Union and with starting conditions
rather different from Hungary or Poland.
Concerning main parties, we focus on those that are
dominant in the respective party system and are most likely
to be affected by the radical right fringe parties, given their
conservative sociocultural leaning. These are the following
main right parties: the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS),
the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria
(GERB), Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance,2 the Czech
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) (see Saxonberg, 2003), and
the Romanian National Liberal Party (PNL) (including its
different alliances). Furthermore, we include two main-
stream parties: the Slovak Direction-Social Democracy
Direction-Social Democracy (SMER-SD) and the Roma-
nian Social Democratic Party (PSD).3 Both parties have a
track record of engaging in nationalist and populist dis-
courses and/or coalitions such as SMER’s government
cooperation with the radical right Slovak National Party
(SNS) and People’s Party - Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (L’S-HZDS) (cf. Pirro, 2015a: 93–95). While
PSD is economically social–democratic, it is a conservative
party on the sociocultural dimension. Confirming that these
are indeed dominant main parties, their average vote share
is 29% (standard deviation ¼ 14).4
Following our earlier definition of radical right fringe
parties and limiting to those with parliamentary represen-
tation, we identified the 12 radical right fringe parties listed
in Table 1. As the categorization of these parties is often
contested, we provide multiple sources for our selection,
including Nedelcu (2012), Minkenberg (2015), Gherghina
et al. (2017), van Kessel (2015), and the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). As we do not have sufficient
data for the Polish KPN from the Manifesto data set, we
analyze 11 radical right fringe parties that have an average
vote share of 8.6% (standard deviation ¼ 4.8).
While not all parties are present at all times, the resulting
data set includes elections from 1990 to 2017. For each elec-
tion, the Manifesto data set provides the saliences of the 11
sociocultural categories mentioned above for each of these
parties’ manifestos whenever the party won at least two seats
in their respective national parliament. From these data, we
construct the main dependent and independent variables. As
the research question concerns a change in the main parties’
manifestos, the dependent variable is the change within the
salience of each of the 11 categories from one election to the
next (i.e. main party salience at t0 subtracted from salience at
t1). As each of the categories is directional (positive or neg-
ative), we can ascertain the strength and direction of the
movement of the main party in their stance toward these
sociocultural issues. This is important as we would expect
main parties to increase the salience of those categories high-
lighted by the radical right fringe parties. The main indepen-
dent variables are the saliences of these categories in the
fringe parties’ manifestos. The main party might react to the
Table 1. Fringe parties in six CEE countries.
Country Party
Period in
parliament Party family Notes
Bulgaria Ataka 2005– Radical RightCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM, PopulistvK
Fringe party (Nedelcu, 2012: 8), in gov. since 2017
Czech Republic SPR-RSCˇ 1992–1998 ConfessionalCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM
Anti-Roma and Anti-German
Dawn 2013– Radical RightCHES, Radical Populist
RightG
Hungary Jobbik 2010– Radical RightCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM, PopulistvK
Fringe party (Nedelcu, 2012: 9)
Poland LPR 2001– ConfessionalCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM
KPN 1991–1993 Radical Populist RightG, Radical RightM (no data available)
SRP 2001–2007 Agrarian/centerCHES, Populist RightM,
Nationalist PopulistvK
in gov. (2006–2007) with PiS and LPR
Romania PRM 1992–2008 Radical RightCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM, PopulistvK
Successful 2000 (close to 20%), but less than 4%
since 2008 (still competing in 2016)
PUNR 1992–2000 Radical Populist RightG
PP-DD 2012– Radical Populist RightG, PopulistvK Radical Right (Busˇtı´kova´, 2015)
Slovakia OLaNO 2012– ConservativeCHES, PopulistvK Fringe party (Nedelcu, 2012: 10), “most imp. issue”
2014 was “anti-elite rhetoric” (CHES)
SNS 1990– Radical RightCHES, Radical Populist
RightG, Radical RightM, PopulistvK
In parliament since 1990 (except 2002 and 2012),
in gov. 1992–1998, 2006–2010, since 2016
Note: CEE: Central and Eastern Europe; CHES: Chapel Hill Expert Survey; G: Gherghina et al., 2017; M: Minkenberg, 2015; vK: van Kessel, 2015; Ataka:
Attack; SPR-RSCˇ: Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; U´svit: Dawn; Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary; LPR: League
of Polish Families; KPN: Confederation Independent Poland; SRP: Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland; PRM: Greater Romania Party; PUNR: Romanian
National Unity Party; PP-DD: People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu ; OL’aNO: Ordinary People and Independent Personalities; SNS: Slovak National Party.
6 Party Politics XX(X)
radical right fringe party at the previous election (t0, if the
fringe party won parliamentary seats) or at the later election
(t1), in response for example to the challenger’s electoral
campaign at t0 or to its issue politics as parliamentary oppo-
sition prior to t1. Therefore, the saliences of the radical right
fringe parties are included into the analysis when they appear
at either time point. In the analysis below, the saliences at t0
and t1 are included separately.
Building on these decisions, the following analysis
investigates the relationship between radical right fringe
party salience and main party movement, controlling for
possible variation between countries and between policy
issues. If we find a significant relationship, this would be
a strong indicator that there might be an effect and would
warrant a more sophisticated analysis. However, our results
strongly suggest that no such relationship exists.5
Figure 1 graphs the relationship between the salience of
sociocultural issues in the radical right fringe party mani-
festos at t0 and the movement in the main party manifestos
from t0 to t1, both for each of the six countries and all data
pooled together. Furthermore, Table A1 in the Online
Appendix includes the results of the correlation analysis.
Both show that the salience in the radical right fringe party
manifestos is not related to the movement in the main par-
ties. The only exception here is Bulgaria where radical right
fringe party salience has a significant negative relationship
with the movement of main parties, meaning that GERB
de-emphasized these issues while Ataka had emphasized
them in the previous election.
Figure 2 shows the respective graphs for the relationship
between the main party movement and the radical right
fringe party salience at t1, meaning the later election at
which the main party change appears. Again, there is gen-
erally no relationship except in Bulgaria, for which Table
A1 in the Online Appendix shows that there is a significant
positive correlation (r ¼ 0.51, p < 0.000, N ¼ 44).
The following part of the analysis takes a closer look at
the 11 categories to discern whether the relationships might
cancel each other out. Figures 3 and 4, therefore, show again
the relationships between main party movement and radical
right fringe party salience, at t0 and t1, respectively. The
graphs with all categories pooled confirm the general finding
that there is no relationship between main movement and
radical right fringe party salience. While there seems to be a
slight inverse relationship for positive mentions of national-
ism and traditional morality, neither relationship is signifi-
cant (shown in Table A2 in the Online Appendix). The
positive relationship in the civic mindedness category seems
to be driven by a small number of outliers.
Similarly, Figure 4 confirms the lack of relationships.
Against common assumptions and regardless of the sal-
ience of anti-multicultural issues, the main parties in
Figure 1. Relationship between fringe party salience at t0 and main party movement from t0 to t1, per country.
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CEE have not significantly changed positions in their man-
ifestos. The only exception is found in the category of
positive statements toward noneconomic groups, which
include women, university students, and specific age
groups (Werner et al., 2014: 26). Here we find a positive
relationship, meaning that when radical right fringe parties
talk more about these groups, main parties also attribute
higher salience to these issues (and vice versa).
To further test these results, we ran a series of ordinary
least square (OLS) models with countries as second-level
variables.6 Table 2 shows the results, with model 1 only
testing the saliences in the radical right fringe party manifes-
tos and model 2 also considering systematic changes in gen-
eral issue importance by including the average movement of
all other parties in the system, and model 3 including time.
The results show that once we control for the other factors,
the salience in radical right fringe party manifestos at the
earlier election has a significant effect. However, this effect
is very small, with only a 0.1 scale point movement (on a
200-point scale) for every 1 scale point in higher salience.
Even more important is the fact that this relationship is neg-
ative. Thus, main parties tend to attribute lower salience to
those categories that were prioritized by the radical right
fringe parties in the previous election. This is in line with
literature on WE such as by Rovny who finds that parties tend
to de-emphasize policies and “blur” their positions where
they are less involved in a given area compared to other
parties that can claim issue ownership and face no dilem-
mas with regard to other policy dimensions (Rovny, 2012,
2013). Moreover, it is also consistent with studies suggest-
ing that main parties sometimes engage in an “adversarial
strategy,” intentionally seeking to distance themselves
from fringe parties in response to their electoral success
or parliamentary breakthrough (e.g. Meguid, 2005: 348).
In a final step of the analysis, we tested for the possibil-
ity that the radical right fringe party salience might not only
be related to the same category. For instance, a change in
the salience of nationalism by the radical right fringe party
might be related to a change in the main party not only in
the nationalism category (observed above) but also in the
anti-nationalism category. The MARPOR data allow for
the investigation of such an effect on three sociocultural
issues: nationalism, traditional morality, and multicultural-
ism. We investigated these relationships in the manner
described above by analyzing graphs and correlations (see
Online Appendix Table A3 and Figures A3–A6) and show
that there is no relationship between the salience attributed
by the radical right fringe parties and the salience of the
opposite category attributed by the main parties (Table 2).
In sum, our analysis of main and radical right fringe
parties in six CEE countries strongly indicates that the
salience of sociocultural issues in fringe party manifestos
Figure 2. Relationship between fringe party salience at t1 and main party movement from t0 to t1, per country.
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Figure 3. Relationship between fringe party salience at t0 and main party movement from t0 to t1, per category.
Figure 4. Relationship between fringe party salience at t1 and main party movement from t0 to t1, per category.
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does not systematically relate to the changes in main party
manifestos regarding those issues. Given that we do not
find any relationship between radical right fringe party
salience and main party movement, it seems save to con-
clude that there is also no effect by the former onto the
latter. The policy issues included in our analysis encompass
both nationalist and anti-immigration issues, which rank
highly on the priority list of the radical right fringe parties
under investigation. While our results do not negate the fact
that the main parties under investigation might often agree
with the fringe parties, it seems rather clear that they do not
systematically affect each other.
Conclusion
Radical right fringe parties seem to be playing an important
role in the development of post-communist politics, as for
example Jobbik in Hungary became the country’s second
largest party, gaining nearly 20% of the vote in the recent
elections, Self-Defence (SRP) and the League of Polish
Families (LPR) held cabinet seats during the Polish gov-
ernment in 2006-7, and three different fringe parties have
held cabinet seats in Slovakia. We would expect this devel-
opment to influence the policies of the main political par-
ties directly, as they might co-opt some of the positions of
the radical right fringe parties to compete with them. At the
same time, previous case analyses and quantitative studies
focusing mainly on WE have revealed that the influence of
these challenger parties may be overstated because main
parties may, out of strategic considerations, even choose to
distance themselves from the radical right fringe rather than
form coalitions with radical outsiders. Studies under the
rubric of “Parroting the Pariah” have shown that the adop-
tion of radical positions may be short-sighted and rather
hurt main parties in the long run since this strategy alienates
key support groups. Others have pointed to common ideo-
logical roots of right-wing parties and the fact that main
right parties, especially in CEE systems, partly already
cover issue positions that would be perceived as radical
in WE party systems, thereby squeezing out the demand
for radical right actors.
The contribution of our analysis is to test whether there
is an agenda stetting effect by radical right fringe parties on
the policy position of main parties in six CEE countries.
This analysis therefore extends the literature on the influ-
ence of radical right fringe parties on their major contend-
ing parties by analyzing their most salient dimension of
contestation. It also adds to the scientific literature by
expanding the number of empirical cases and increasing
the period of study to nearly three decades. Our principal
findings are that the party manifestos do not show a statis-
tically significant correlation between issue salience of rad-
ical right fringe parties and the programmatic movements
by main parties. This finding is robust over 11 sociocultural
policy issues, over time, and different analytical angles.
Bulgaria presents a slight exception, but even there, the
influence is quite small. Since we do not find a relationship
between radical right fringe party and main party program-
matic offerings, for the post-communist cases, our study
confirms the arguments of scholars such as Mudde
(2013), Akkerman (2015), and Meyer and Rosenberger
(2015), who claim that fringe parties have only limited
influence over the policies of main parties. It also appears
to confirm the view of those scholars arguing that the radi-
calization of the mainstream may have squeezed out fringe
parties and neutralized their impact on main parties’ agen-
das (Busˇtı´kova´ and Kitschelt, 2009; Pirro, 2015a: 80;
Pytlas, 2018b). This is, of course, not to deny that radical
right fringe parties have had influence on post-communist
politics, as some of them have even participated in govern-
ment coalitions. However, it shows that on sociocultural
issues, radical right fringe parties do not systematically pull
main parties into their corner of the competition. Impor-
tantly, sociocultural issues have been at the core of con-
testation in CEE party systems well before recent crises
around the EU and refugees have brought them into focus
in WE. Thus, fringe party influence on main parties may be
based not only on strategic calculations on the part of the
main parties but also dependent on the long-term salience
of these parties’ issues.
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Table 2. Explaining main party movement, OLS regression with
six country clusters.
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Movement
others
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Constant 0.082 (0.21) 0.101 (0.21) 39.706 (24.96)
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Notes
1. Focusing on the conditions of successful radical right mobili-
zation, Busˇtı´kova´ (2014) furthermore shows that the behavior
of center–left parties also affects the relationship between rad-
ical right fringe and main parties.
2. Before 2003: Hungary Federation of Young Democrats—
Hungarian Civic Union (FiDeSz-MPSz).
3. Before 2001: Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR),
and before 1993: Democratic National Salvation Front
(FDNS).
4. Some of these parties have formed alliances during the time
under investigation. These alliances were included in the anal-
ysis if the party under investigation was the dominant alliance
partner.
5. These results are confirmed by an analysis of the relationships
between the saliences of radical right fringe and main parties
directly. While we find such a relationship for the saliences at
the same election, which we would expect given that these
parties belong to similar party families, there is no relationship
once we lag the effect. These results can be found in Online
Appendix II.
6. Table A2 in the Online Appendix also includes the 11 cate-
gories as explanatory variables, including interacted with the
fringe party saliences at t0 and t1.
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